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ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES* 
 
Arvid Båve, Stockholm University 
 
A good case has recently been made for identifying propositions with a kind of 
structured act types. Unfortunately, as we will see in this paper, this “act-type theory 
of propositions” entails an unacceptable kind—and amount—of ambiguity in our 
language. Before outlining this problem, however, let me briefly introduce the theory 
by relating four central points about it.  
Firstly, act-type theories divide into Russellian and Fregean variants. The former 
identifies the proposition that Socrates is wise with the act type of predicating the 
property of wisdom of Socrates, whereas Fregean variants would rather identify it 
with some act type directed toward the senses of ‘wise’ and ‘Socrates’, for instance, 
the act type of saturating the sense of ‘wise’ with that of ‘Socrates’.1 (I will discuss 
																																																								
* For valuable comments and help, I would like to thank Matti Eklund, Johan 
Gustafsson, Peter Pagin, and the audiences at the 2018 Workshop on the philosophy 
of Edward Zalta, Warsaw, the Kolloquium Fuhrmann, Philosophy Department at the 
Goethe University in Frankfurt, the higher seminar in Theoretical Philosophy at 
Uppsala University, and the CLLAM seminar at the Philosophy Department, 
Stockholm University. 
1 The Russellian variant is developed at length by Scott Soames, What is Meaning? 
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2010) and Rethinking Language, Mind, 
and Meaning (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 2015). The Fregean variant 
has not quite been identified—let alone defended—in the literature, although Wayne 
Davis comes close in his Meaning, Expression, and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). In Peter Hanks, “Structured Propositions as Types”, Mind 
CXX, 477, (January 2011): 11–52, and Propositional Content, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), an ecumenical theory is defended, on which the proposition 
that Socrates is wise consists of three “component” act types: referring to Socrates, 
expressing wisdom, and predicating wisdom of Socrates. See also Jeffrey King, Scott 
Soames, and Jeff Speaks, eds., New Thinking About Propositions (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013).  
Related but distinct contemporary views are found in Michael Jubien, 
“Propositions and the Objects of Thought”, Philosophical Studies, CIV, 1 (May 2001): 
47–62, Friederike Moltmann, “Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction 
between actions and products”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XXXXIII, 5-6. 
(2013): 679–701. Chapter 4 of Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural 
Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), and Sean Crawford, 
“Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?”, Philosophical Studies, CLXVIII, 
(March  2014): 179–210.  
A partly historical work on this theme is Friederike Moltmann and Mark Textor, 
eds., Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content: Contemporary and Historical 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), where Husserl, Meinong, 
Reinach, and Twardowski are presented as important historical forerunners. I would 
consider including Locke and Arnault, but I will not argue the point here. 
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only act-type theorists’ treatments of logically atomic propositions, as logically 
complex propositions will be of no relevance for my argument.) 
Secondly, there is a very common first impression of the act-type theory—to the 
effect that it must be a plain non-starter—that we should mention at the outset, if only 
to have it out of our way. The idea is that the theory is a “category mistake,” since 
“one cannot believe an act type”, “act types cannot be true or false”, and so on. I take 
Benjamin Schnieder and Scott Soames to have responded decisively to this type of 
objection, so I will be content to defer to their works.2 
Thirdly, the two main act-type theorists, Scott Soames and Peter Hanks, each 
identify propositions with some more familiar act on propositions. Soames claims that 
they are acts of entertaining, so that the proposition that Socrates is wise = the act 
type of predicating wisdom of Socrates = the act type of entertaining the proposition 
that Socrates is wise.3 Hanks instead takes propositions to be acts of judging.4 The 
question which of these alternatives is preferable has generated a significant literature, 
but will not concern us here, as it is unrelated to my argument. 
Fourth, and finally, the general spirit of the act-type theory is well illustrated by 
listing its main alleged advantages, which include its ability to do the following: 
 
(1) solve the problem of the unity of the proposition,  
(2) explain how propositions can be inherently representational and have their 
truth conditions essentially,  
(3) provide an attractive model of structured propositions,  
(4)  avoid Benacerraf problems of arbitrary identifications,  
(5)  explain how we can have cognitive access to propositions, and (yet) 
(6)  meet the Fregean demand of making propositions abstract, eternal and mind-
independent (in the sense that they can exist without any minds existing). 
 
Now, while some aspects of the act-type theory have been explored in detail, 
particularly those connected with the alleged benefits above, little attention has been 
devoted to the question of how to develop an act-type-theoretical compositional 
semantics. It is in this connection that the ambiguity problem arises. It arises because 
many sentences have alternative analyses.5 For instance, ‘Mary loves John’ can be 
analysed in three different ways: as the result of saturating ‘ξ loves John’ with 																																																								
2  See Benjamin Schnieder, “By Leibniz’s Law: Remarks on a Fallacy”, The 
Philosophical Quarterly, LVI, 222 (January 2006): 39–54 and Soames, Rethinking 
Language, Mind, and Meaning, op. cit., pp. 25ff. 
3 Soames, What Is Meaning?, op. cit.; and Soames, Rethinking Language, Mind, and 
Meaning, op. cit.  
4 4 Hanks, “Structured Propositions as Types,” op. cit.; and Hanks, Propositional 
Content, op. cit.   
5 This term derives from Michael Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1981), Chapters 15–16, but Frege had 
already discussed alternative analyses—both of sentences and of thoughts—in several 
places. See, for instance, Gottlob Frege, “Begriffsschrift: a formalized language of 
pure thought modelled upon the language of arithmetic,” (1879), Translations from 
the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1879/1970), pp. 1–20, section 9; and in Gottlob Frege, 
Posthumous Writings, ed. Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, and Friedrich 
Kaulbach, trans. Peter Long and Roger White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), p. 191ff.  
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‘Mary’, of saturating ‘Mary loves ξ’ with ‘John’, or of saturating ‘ξ loves ζ’ by 
‘Mary’ and ‘John’ (in its first and second place, respectively). (Note that ‘saturate’ is 
here used in a sense related to linguistic expressions, distinct from the sense intended 
above, related to senses.)  
On the most obvious semantics to accompany a Russellian act-type theory, the 
sentence therefore comes out as expressing both  
 
the act type of predicating the property of loving John of Mary  
 
and  
 
the act type of predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John.  
 
But since these act types are directed toward distinct entities, I will argue, they are 
themselves distinct. Standard act-type theories are thus committed to taking this 
sentence to be ambiguous. Since this ambiguity is neither intuitive, nor supported by 
any other kind of linguistic evidence, I regard this argument as a reductio of standard 
act-type theories. The argument easily generalizes to any atomic sentence with a 
polyadic predicate. Worse, the number of propositions a sentence comes out as 
expressing increases exponentially with the number of singular terms in it, making 
relatively simple sentences come out massively ambiguous.  
As we will see, however, act-type theorists could try to avoid this consequence by 
positing several basic act types, say, predicating, predicating*, predicating**, and so 
on. The final argument will therefore take the form of a dilemma, with standard act-
type theories on one horn and this “pluralist” variant on the other. 
The paper is structured as follows. §1 presents some terminology and basic facts 
about alternative analyses, and next argues that we have no choice but to accept that 
certain sentences, as well as the propositions they express, indeed have alternative 
analyses. §2 contains a general discussion about act types and their linguistic 
designators. I there defend two principles about the identity conditions of act types, 
which play an important role in the argument. §3 lays out the main argument in full, 
with the required assumptions about semantic axioms for atomic sentences, and 
discusses a couple of objections as well as the question whether act-type theorists may 
bite the bullet and accept the ambiguity. §4 presents an additional argument against 
pluralist act-type theories, and §5 discusses three retreat positions act-type theorists 
might consider in view of my argument. In §6, finally, I consider whether the 
argument generalizes to any theory of structured propositions but conclude that it only 
sets a constraint on them. It is shown that Jeffrey King’s theory6 fails to satisfy it, and 
thus faces the same ambiguity problem as the act-type theory. 
 
I. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES OF SENTENCES AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
I will here explain in greater detail what alternative analyses are and why they are 
unavoidable. In preparation, I will first introduce some terminology. I will distinguish 
between simple predicates like ‘ξ runs’ or ‘ξ = ζ’, and complex ones, like ‘ξ = 3’, 
which results from saturating (in the linguistic sense) the dyadic predicate ‘ξ = ζ’ in 
																																																								
6 See Jeffrey King, The Nature and Structure of Content (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
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its second place by ‘3’. (When saying that ‘ξ runs’ is simple, I ignore tense and 
mood.) 
Further, I will enclose expressions within square brackets, ‘[‘ and ‘]’, to refer to the 
semantic correlate of the expression within. On the Russellian conception of 
propositions, [love] will be the loving relation, whereas on the Fregean conception it 
will be the sense of ‘love’. Although ‘semantic correlate’ may on the Russellian 
conception seem to mean the same as ‘semantic value’, the latter term would not be 
neutral with respect to the Russellian-Fregean divide. For on Fregean act-type 
theories, we want the term to cover the sense of a name, but the “semantic value” of a 
name is rather ubiquitously taken to be its referent. Better, then, to use the neutral 
term ‘correlate’. Note that on both conceptions, the semantic correlate of a sentence is 
the proposition it expresses. Since the argument is wholly formulated in these neutral 
terms, it targets at once Fregean and Russellian act-type theories. 
Now, we have seen that ‘Mary loves John’ has three analyses. Sentences with more 
names will have more intricate analyses. For instance, ‘F(a, b, c, d, e)’ can be 
analysed inter alia as resulting from saturating ‘F(a, ξ, c, d, ζ)’ with ‘b’ and ‘e’ (in its 
first and second argument places, respectively). Now, it is easy to see that the number 
of analyses of an atomic sentence is the same as the number of predicates that can be 
obtained from it by removing one or more names. This number grows exponentially 
with the number of names in it: with one name, you get only one analysis, with two 
names, three analyses, with three names, seven analyses, with four names, fifteen 
analyses, and with five names, thirty-one analyses. More generally, a sentence with n 
names has 2"#$% n−i analyses. We will see below that act-type theorists must posit a 
separate proposition expressed for each analysis. Hence, the sentence, ‘6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 
1’ comes out as expressing 31 propositions! 
There are two main kinds of resistance against the idea of alternative analyses. 
Frank Ramsey took the very idea to be incoherent, saying that propositions of the 
form ‘Rab’ would be associated with “an incomprehensible trinity, as senseless as that 
of theology”.7 I side with Geach and Dummett8, however, in deeming his attitude 
ungrounded, and act-type theorists will scarcely want to respond to the argument by 
echoing Ramsey’s scepticism, especially given the reasons for accepting alternative 
analyses I will present anon. Secondly, one may consider alternative analyses 
intelligible but unnecessary, and insist that, for instance, ‘Mary loves John’ only 
needs to be analysed as formed by the simple expressions, ‘ξ loves ζ’, ‘Mary’, and 
‘John’. 
Now, the reason we need to accept alternative analyses is that we have to posit 
complex predicates and, to go with them, complex predicative propositional 
constituents. But—as Ramsey correctly noted—once we do, alternative analyses are 
inevitable. The second part is obvious. For if there is such a predicate as ‘ξ loves 
John’, then surely it can be saturated with ‘Mary’ to yield ‘Mary loves John’, and 
similarly for ‘Mary loves ξ’ and ‘John’. And this is just what it means for the sentence 
to have alternative analyses. 
The reason we need to posit complex predicates is less obvious. I think we need 
complex predicates for many purposes in semantics and logic, but I will focus on an 
argument to the effect that we need them to state certain generalizations about 																																																								
7 Frank Ramsey, “Universals”, Mind, XXXIV, 136 (October 1925):  401–417, at 406. 
8  See Peter Geach, “Names and Identity”, in Samuel Guttenplan, ed., Mind and 
Language (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975): 139–158 and Dummett, The 
Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 264ff. 
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inferences.9 Take the commonplace claim that the law of substitution of identicals is 
truth-preserving. We could state this claim thus: 
 
(SI) For any sentences of the forms ‘a = b’, ‘F(a)’, and ‘F(b)’, if the first two are 
true, so is the third. 
 
Here, a sentence of the form ‘F(a)’ is of course a sentence formed by saturating a 
monadic predicate with a name. But unless we posit complex monadic predicates, like 
‘ξ loves John’, (SI) will not even entail such obvious instances of (SI) as, 
 
 (SII) If ‘John = James’ and ‘John loves Mary’ are true, so is ‘James loves Mary’. 
 
Thus, we must accept complex predicates and, hence, alternative analyses.  
Assuming propositions are structured (as agreed by act-type theorists), we can also 
show that there are alternative analyses of propositions. If propositions are structured, 
then a sentence ‘F(a)’ must be taken to express a proposition composed of the 
semantic correlates of ‘F(ξ)’ and ‘a’, that is, [F(ξ)] and [a]. [F(a)] is thus the value of 
some function f from [F(ξ)] and [a]; that is, [F(a)] = f([F(ξ)], [a]). 10  But for a 
sentence like ‘Mary loves John’, there are two choices for the respective ‘F(ξ)’ and 
‘a’. Thus, its semantic correlate, [Mary loves John], must be identical to both f([Mary 
loves ξ], [John]) and f([ξ loves John], [Mary]). And this is just what it means for a 
proposition to have alternative analyses. 
The idea of alternative analyses of propositions is not new. Frege writes, 
 
If several proper names occur in a sentence, the corresponding Gedanke can be 
analyzed into a complete part and an unsaturated part in different ways. The Sinn of 
each of these proper names can be set up as the complete part over against the rest of 
the Gedanke as the unsaturated part.11  
 
Alternative analyses of propositions can also be established by an argument similar to 
the one involving (SI) above. To see this, consider how we might formulate a variant 
of (SI) that concerns structured propositions rather than sentences. The obvious idea is 
to say, 
 
(PI) For every x, y, P, if f2([=], x, y) and f(P, x) are true, then f(P, y) is true. 
 
Here, as before, f takes the semantic correlates of a monadic predicate and a name to a 
proposition composed by the two, and f2 takes the semantic correlates of a dyadic 
predicate and two names to a proposition composed of them. The variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ 
in (PI) range over the propositional constituents related to proper names (objects or 
name-senses), and ‘P’ ranges over predicative, monadic propositional constituents 																																																								
9 This argument resembles a line of thought pursued by Dummett, The Interpretation 
of Frege’s Philosophy: 273ff., but I will not discuss the relationship between them 
here. He actually argued for the stronger and stranger claim that we must posit such 
predicates as the monadic predicate, ‘ξ killed ξ’, but I will be content to argue merely 
for positing such predicates as ‘Mary loves ξ’, ‘John gives ξ to ζ’, and so on. 
10 For a detailed discussion of this use of functors to designate propositions, see Arvid 
Båve, “Concept Designation”, American Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. 
11  Frege, Posthumous Writings, op. cit., p. 192. 
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(properties or monadic, predicative senses). But unless ‘P’ ranges over both simple 
and complex predicative propositional constituents, (PI) will fail to entail,  
 
(PII) If f2([=], [John], [James]) and f([Mary loves ξ], [John]) are true,  
then f([Mary loves ξ], [James]) is true.  
 
So, we must posit complex predicative propositional constituents, which commits us 
to alternative analyses of propositions. 
 Objection 1: The above appeal to (PI) and (PII) begs the question against 
Russellians, since they are committed to taking these principles to be incoherent. This 
is so, since, on their view, and assuming that John = James, the second and third 
propositions mentioned in (PII) are identical. (PII) therefore cannot be an instance of 
the law of substitution of identicals, properly speaking.12 Reply: I think it is simply 
undeniable that (PII) is an instance of the claim that the law of substitution for 
structured propositions is truth-preserving, and I think Russellians must agree. It is 
undeniable, after all, that the following is an instance of this claim: 
 
If the proposition that Phosphorus is hot is true, and the proposition that 
Phosphorus = Hesperus is true, then the proposition that Hesperus is hot is true. 
 
Further, I do not see why Russellians should take (PI) to be incoherent. Their 
commitment to taking (PII) to concern only two propositions I think seems no more 
problematic than their usual commitment to identifying propositions others take to be 
distinct, such as [Hesperus is hot] and [Phosphorus is hot]. Perhaps what makes (PI) 
seem uncongenial to Russellians is merely the word ‘substitution’, since it suggests 
that one thing is “substituted for” another thing. But Russellians can then simply 
accept (PI)—as it seems they must in any case—and choose a different name for it. 
Russellians are also not committed to taking (PI) to be objectionably trivial. For by 
replacing ‘[=]’ in (PI) with ‘[love]’, we get a false principle. Thus, even Russellians 
can take (PI) to tell us something informative (as far as logical laws go) about 
identity. 
 Objection 2: ‘Mary loves John’ has only one analysis, on which its structure is NP-
VP. Reply: natural language sentences plausibly have both ordinary phrase structure 
and predicate-argument structure. Besides, it would be bad enough for the act-type 
theorist if the relevant sentences of first-order logic came out as ambiguous, however 
things stand with natural languages.  
 
II. ACT TYPES AND THEIR DESIGNATORS 
 
The present case against the act-type theory leans heavily on two principles stating 
identity conditions on act types, which I will introduce and defend in this section. 
These principles will be formulated using such schematic expressions like ‘the act 
type of ϕ-ing x1, …, xn’, with instances such as ‘kissing John’, ‘giving a to b’, and, of 
course, ‘the act type of predicating wisdom of Socrates’, routinely used by act-type 
theorists.13 (I will mostly omit the apposition, ‘the act type of’, however.)  
																																																								
12 This objection is due to an anonymous referee for this journal.  
13 See, for example, Soames, Rethinking Language, Mind, and Meaning, op. cit., p. 20 
and Hanks, Propositional Content, op. cit., pp. 36ff. 
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Expressions of the form ‘ϕ-ing x1, …, xn’ will be called “structural, canonical act-
type designators”, or SCADs. SCADs are like ‘that’-clauses in that they have their 
references independently of any empirical facts, except the facts about what their 
constituent expressions mean (hence, ‘canonical’). ‘That’-clauses are like this, too, 
and thus differ from such “accidental”, non-canonical proposition-designators as 
‘what he said’, which do so depend. Act types, too, can be referred to thus 
“accidentally”: compare ‘killing Caesar’ with ‘the act type Brutus is best known for 
(having performed a token of)’. 
SCADs are important for act-type theorists, partly because they are canonical in 
the sense above, but mainly because they contain designators of propositional 
constituents, as witnessed by ‘the act type of predicating wisdom of Socrates’, 
containing ‘wisdom’ and ‘Socrates’. They thereby enable straightforward 
formulations of compositional semantic axioms for atomic sentences. Note that this 
does not hold for our brackets: ‘[F(a)]’ does not contain ‘[a]’. 
The most important principle about act types for the argument to come is, 
 
(A1) If the act type of ϕ-ing x1, …, xm = the act type of ϕ-ing y1, …, yn,  
then each of x1, …, xm is identical to one of y1, …, yn. 
 
To give an intuitive feel for (A1), suppose we have three distinct bricks, a, b, c. 
Surely, the act type of laying a on b cannot be identical with the act type of laying a 
on c or laying c on b. Thus, if laying x on y = laying z on w, then each of x and y must 
be identical to one of z and w, and so on for any basic act type and any number of 
objects thereby acted upon. Note, though, that x need not be identical with z here, 
since many acts are symmetrical, like putting together x and y. (When discussing act 
types like ϕ-ing x, y, …, I will occasionally speak of ϕ-ing as the basic act type, and 
the following objects, x, y, …, as the objects acted upon.)14 
 If (A1) is true, then predicating the property of loving John of Mary must be 
distinct from predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John, since the four 
objects acted upon here are distinct. (A1) thereby plays an important part of the 
argument for the claim that act-type theorists are committed to taking ‘Mary loves 
John’ to be ambiguous.  
(A1) also entails that act-type theorists are committed to holding that an atomic 
sentence with n alternative analyses will also express n propositions. This, as we have 
seen, commits them to taking fairly simple sentences to express very many 
propositions. To see that this is entailed by (A1), recall that each analysis of a given 
sentence involves a predicate of its own. Each predicate in turn has its own semantic 
correlate (that is, every other predicate extractable from the sentence has a distinct 
correlate). It follows, by (A1), that each analysis will be coupled with a unique act 
type. By standard semantic axioms for atomic sentences (more on which in §3), it 
follows that each such unique act type is a proposition expressed by the sentence. 
As already mentioned in the introduction, one might now try to avoid the argument 
from (A1) by positing two distinct act types, say, predicating and predicating*. (A1) 
cannot then be used to infer the ambiguity claim, since (A1) contains two occurrences 
of the same schematic letter, ‘ϕ’. But one might think there is an equally plausible 
principle threatening this alternative version of the act-type theory: 																																																								
14 Basic act types in this sense are not related to basic actions in the sense of Arthur 
Danto, “Basic Actions”, American Philosophical Quarterly, II, 2 (April 1965): 141–
148. 
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(A*) If ϕ-ing x1, …, xm = ψ-ing y1, …, yn, then each of x1, …, xm is identical to 
one of y1, …, yn. 
 
With (A*), we can infer the ambiguity claim, since we here have two distinct 
schematic letters, ‘ϕ’ and ‘ψ’. However, (A*) is inconsistent with the plausible claim, 
 
(ID)  For every act type a, a = the act type of performing a. 
 
Given (ID), performing the act type of kissing John = kissing John, but, of course, 
kissing John ≠ John, so (A*) is false. Another counterexample to (A*) is the 
following: say that x johnates y just in case x introduces John to y, and that x maryizes 
y just in case x introduces y to Mary. Now, plausibly, johnating Mary = maryizing 
John, although John ≠ Mary.  
Note, though, that these examples involve act types that somehow “overlap”. Now, 
it is plausible to think that the only counterexamples to (A*) involve precisely such 
overlapping act types. We could thus qualify (A*) by requiring the act types not to 
overlap, and this will give us a principle that can be used in the argument against the 
pluralist version of the act-type theory: 
 
(A2) If (i) ϕ-ing x1, …, xn = ψ-ing y1, …, yn and (ii) ϕ-ing and ψ-ing do not 
overlap, then each of x1, …, xm is identical to one of y1, …, yn. 
 
The notion of overlapping requires some explanation. Let’s say that act types involve 
other act types and objects, where this notion is governed by the schema: 
 
(IS) The act type of ϕ-ing x1, …, xn involves ϕ-ing, as well as each of 
x1, …, xn. 
 
I will not be more specific about what involvement amounts to (for instance, by 
giving necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being involved in an act 
type). I take (IS) to be undeniable, since it is merely a stipulation, and I note that it 
does not force upon us any particular view about the nature of involvement. In 
particular, it does not require that we see involvement as somehow mereological, nor 
as a particularly eligible/natural relation in the standard, Lewisian sense. If these 
observations are kept in mind, I think (IS) must be seen as acceptable, at least pending 
an argument to the contrary. 
It would now be natural to propose that for two act types to overlap is for there to 
be something they both involve. But given (ID), performing is involved in every act 
type. Hence, every act type overlaps with every other act type in this sense of 
‘overlap’. I will therefore say instead that two act types overlap just in case they 
involve something not involved in every act type. Then, if two act types fail to 
overlap, they are as disjoint as act types can be. The special case of johnating and 
maryizing then comes out as a case of overlap in this sense, but other examples will 
be far between. 
(A2) is plausible because its antecedent is plausibly false. For suppose that ϕ-ing 
and ψ-ing do not overlap. Then, they are as disjoint as act types can possibly be, like, 
say, kicking and conceiving-of. Then, surely, ϕ-ing x1, …, xn cannot be the same as ψ-
ing y1, …, yn. Hence, the antecedent of (A2) cannot be true, and so (A2) is true. (A2) 
entails that if ‘Mary loves John’ is not ambiguous, then predicating and predicating* 
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overlap. Thus, to avoid the ambiguity claim, adherents of the pluralist act-type theory 
must take predicating and predicating* to overlap. I argue in §3 that this is a dubious 
claim. 
 I said that (A1) is obvious, but some readers might not be convinced. I will here 
point to some possible misinterpretations of (A1) on which it will seems unobvious or 
even false (much of this discussion will apply equally to (A2)). Firstly, it is natural to 
say that laying a on b is “the same kind of act” as laying a on c, even if a, b, and c are 
distinct. As an observation about our lay talk of act types, this is plausible enough. 
But, firstly, the finer division into object-related act types surely can be made. Also, 
act-type theorists clearly need to make it, on pain of saying that all atomic sentences 
express the same proposition (on a Russellian variant, this would be the mere act type 
of predicating). 
Doubts about (A1) might also be due to conflating 
 
(i)  identity with being tokens of the same type, 
(ii) act types with act tokens, 
(iii) act types with their results. 
 
That these are indeed erroneous conflations will be obvious, but we do well to make 
them explicit, to ward off any possible confusion about (A1).  
Firstly, concerning conflation (i), some readers might take (A1)–(A2) to be 
unobvious because they read ‘=’ as expressing the relation that holds between two 
things just in case they belong to the same type. Of course, it is unclear what “the 
type” is supposed to be here, but I am merely trying to identify a possible misreading 
on which the relevant identities may seem unobvious.  
Concerning (ii), some accept the “Anscombe-Davidson Thesis”, saying that if A ϕ-
s by ψ-ing, then A’s ϕ-ing = A’s ψ-ing.15 An instance here would be, ‘If I insult John 
by insulting his mother, then my insulting John will be identical with my insulting his 
mother’. This case may seem to contradict (A1), until we notice that it concerns act 
tokens, whereas (A1) concerns act types. Clearly, the act types of insulting John and 
insulting John’s mother are distinct, since it is possible to perform one without 
performing the other. 
Thirdly, we might easily slip into reading phrases like ‘saturating x with y’ as 
referring to the result of saturating x with y. When speaking of ‘saturating a predicate 
with a name’, for instance, we tend to focus at the results rather than the act types of 
doing so (where the results in question are of course linguistic expressions). On such a 
“result reading” of the SCADs in (A1), it is false, but this is of course not a problem 
for (A1).  
It will be illustrative to see why (A1), under the “result reading”, is false. Suppose 
we have three pieces of Lego, G, Y, and B (for green, yellow, and blue), and suppose 
that x^y is the result (not the act type) of attaching x on top of y. Here, x^y is a 
physical object consisting of x and y. Now, it should be clear upon reflection that 
(G^Y)^B = G^(Y^B). But since G^Y ≠ B ≠ G ≠ Y^B, (A1) is false under the relevant 
interpretation (I use ‘a ≠ b ≠ …’ to say that all of a, b, … are distinct from one 
another). However, the act type (as opposed to the result) of attaching G^Y on top of 
																																																								
15 See Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, Journal of Philosophy, LX, 
23 (November 1963): 685–700, at pp. 697f. 
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B is not identical with the act type of attaching G on top of Y^B, since they are not 
necessarily co-performed. 
This example helps us respond to another objection against (A1). To wit, one 
might object that (A1) seems plausible only so long as we focus on examples with 
wholly disjoint objects, whereas when we consider overlapping objects, things are less 
clear. Thus, predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John could be 
identical with predicating the property of loving John of Mary, after all, since these 
properties overlap (they both involve loving). But G^Y and Y^B clearly overlap, and 
the relevant act types (as opposed to results) are still distinct. The objector is now hard 
pressed to explain why the case with properties should differ.  
 
III. THE ARGUMENT 
 
We are now in a position to present in full detail the argument involving ‘Mary loves 
John’, including the necessary assumptions about semantic axioms. Any 
compositional semantics will need some semantic axiom(s) showing how the 
semantic correlate of a sentence or complex predicate is determined by the correlates 
of its immediate parts. The simplest and most uniform semantics will operate with 
some axiom like,  
 
(PA) PLUGi(‘F(ξ1, …, ξn)’, ‘a’) has plugi([F(ξ1, …, ξn)], [a]) as its semantic 
correlate, 
 
where PLUGi is a mode of combination, taking an n-place predicate ‘F(ξ1, …, ξn)’ 
and a name ‘a’ to the n−1-place predicate resulting from saturating (or “plugging”) 
‘F(ξ1, …, ξn)’ in its ith place with ‘a’ (here, the n–1-place predicate may be 0-place, 
in which case it is a sentence). Thus, PLUG2 takes ‘ξ loves ζ’ and ‘John’ to ‘ξ loves 
John’, and so on. Further, the nature pf plugi([F(ξ1, …, ξn)], [a]) will of course depend 
on whether we adopt a Russellian or Fregean conception of propositions (this “plug 
notation” is due to Zalta16). 
While (PA) is natural, it is not mandatory, so we should not assume that act-type 
theorists are committed to it. And it suffices for the argument that we suppose only 
that they are committed to the weaker,  
 
(P1) For any monadic predicate ‘F(ξ)’ and name ‘a’, PLUG1(‘F(ξ)’, ‘a’) 
expresses plug1([F(ξ)], [a]), 
 
where plug1(x, y) is some act type on x and y. (In (P1), the clumsy ‘has as its semantic 
correlate’ can be replaced with ‘expresses’, since it deals only with sentences and 
propositions.) We are here presupposing that ‘Mary loves John’ = PLUG1(‘Mary 
loves ξ’, ‘John’), and so on, but this falls directly out of the definition of PLUG1 in 
terms of ‘saturate’. The claim that ‘Mary loves John’ has alternative analyses can now 
be expressed as follows:  
 
(P2) ‘Mary loves John’ = PLUG1(‘Mary loves ξ’, ‘John’) = PLUG1(‘ξ loves 
John’, ‘Mary’). 
 																																																								
16 Edward Zalta, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Cambridge, 
MA.: MIT Press, 1988). 
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It follows from (P1) and (P2) that: 
 
 (C) (a) ‘Mary loves John’ expresses plug1([Mary loves ξ], [John]), 
   (b) ‘Mary loves John’ expresses plug1([ξ loves John], [Mary]). 
 
Further, where x is the semantic correlate of a monadic predicate, act-type theorists 
must take plug1(x, y), to be an act type directed toward x and y. It is now tempting to 
infer (from (P1) and (P2)) that they are also committed to holding that, for some act 
type A and for any predicate ‘F(ξ)’, PLUG1(‘F(ξ)’, ‘a’) expresses A-ing [F(ξ)], [a]. 
This would be fallacious, however. What follows is merely that for all predicates 
‘F(ξ)’, there is an act type A such that PLUG1(‘F(ξ)’, ‘a’) expresses A-ing [F(ξ)], [a]. 
A counterexample to the fallacious inference is a case with two distinct act types, 
A-ing and A*-ing, such that ‘Mary loves John’ expresses the act type of A-ing [ξ loves 
John], [Mary] and the act type of A*-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John]. This hypothesis 
forms the second horn of our dilemma.  
Grabbing now the first horn, assume first that the act-type theorist posits only one 
basic act type, which we call A-ing. He will then define plug1 so that, where x is a 
monadic predicative propositional constituent, 
 
 plug1(x, y) = the act type of performing A toward x and y (in that order), 
 
or, for short, 
 
 plug1(x, y) = A-ing x, y. 
 
Given these assumptions, (C) above entails 
 
(C2) (a) ‘Mary loves John’ expresses A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John], 
(b) ‘Mary loves John’ expresses A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary]. 
 
The unacceptable conclusion that ‘Mary loves John’ is ambiguous follows from (C2) 
and the claim, 
 
 (≠) A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] ≠ A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary], 
 
which in turn follows from (A1) plus the trivial assumption that [Mary] ≠ [ξ loves 
John] ≠ [John] ≠ [Mary loves ξ].  
Showing how this argument applies to the specific views of flesh-and-blood act-
type theorists, like Soames and Hanks, is now a trivial exercise. For instance, the 
instantiation of (≠) relevant to Soames’s theory would just be 
 
(≠I) The act type of predicating the property of being loved by Mary of John ≠  
the act type of predicating the property of loving John of Mary.  
 
In Hanks’s case, we would also need to assume that complex act types that are 
composed of distinct sets of sub-acts are distinct, but this is obvious enough.  
Consider now the second horn of the dilemma, concerning pluralism. On this view, 
different basic act types must be appealed to depending on whether the predicate is of 
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the form ‘R(ξ, a)’ or ‘R(a, ξ)’. Rather than (C2), pluralism is committed to there being 
two distinct act types, A-ing and A*-ing, such that 
 
(C2*) (a) ‘Mary loves John’ expresses A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John], 
(b) ‘Mary loves John’ expresses A*-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary]. 
 
By (A2) plus trivial distinctness claims, we can now infer that ‘Mary loves John’ is 
unambiguous only if A-ing and A*-ing overlap. Let us now discuss this commitment. 
These act types would overlap, of course, if they were identical, and this is a fully 
intelligible hypothesis. But this just brings us back to the first horn of the dilemma. 
Thus, we must rather consider the hypothesis that they overlap but are distinct. But it 
is difficult to see just which object or basic act type these act types are supposed to 
have in common. Positing two distinct act types and insisting that they overlap also 
seems ad hoc: two unobvious claims are made here only to avoid the conclusion that 
‘Mary loves John’ is ambiguous. To dodge this suspicion, some independent 
argument for this view is needed, but it is hard to see what such support might consist 
in. If, surprisingly, this way out should turn out viable, it would be a notable deviation 
from standard act-type theories, and thus we would have a significant result in any 
case. 
Let me now consider an objection against this main line of argument. According to 
the objection, we can only conclude that the relevant sentences are ambiguous by 
making the implausible assumption that if a sentence expresses several propositions, 
then it is ambiguous. But this is false, since context-sensitive sentences can be 
unambiguous and yet express several propositions. But my argument does not require 
this implausible assumption. It goes through on the more plausible assumption that a 
sentence is ambiguous if it expresses several propositions in each context. The way in 
which ‘Mary loves John’ comes out (on act-type theories) as expressing several 
propositions does not depend on the context, and thus it expresses several 
propositions in each context. Hence, it is ambiguous. Besides, this last step of my 
argument is not really necessary: we could have omitted the word ‘ambiguous’ and 
said merely that act-type theories are committed to ‘Mary loves John’ expressing 
several propositions, independently of context and of any lexical ambiguity in ‘loves’. 
This commitment is bad enough. 
Let us now ask whether the act-type theorist can bite the bullet and accept the 
ambiguity that ensues from their theory. It may be thought that all I have shown is 
that ‘Mary loves John’ is syntactically ambiguous, and therefore expresses several 
propositions, which is commonplace. But the phenomenon of alternative analyses is 
different from syntactic ambiguity, as ordinarily conceived. A standard example of 
the latter is, ‘Flying planes can be dangerous’. This sentence is clearly ambiguous, 
saying, on one parsing, that the activity of flying planes can be dangerous, and, on the 
other, that planes that fly can be dangerous. But ‘Mary loves John’ is quite different. 
A fortiori, it does not seem to “say” different things depending on the “parsing”. 
Biting this bullet thus means hypostatizing an ambiguity where there does not seem to 
be one, and without any other, independent reason contrary to standard 
methodological principles of semantic theory. 
Accepting the ambiguity of the relevant sentences would also raise new, awkward 
questions. For instance, which of the 31 propositions expressed by ‘6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 1’ 
does one believe when, as we would naïvely put it, one “believes that 6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 
1”? All of them? Could one believe one but not the others? If one can, then how do 
the beliefs differ? Note that if one cannot, then the claim that they are nevertheless 
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distinct violates even the fine-grained “cognitive significance” test of propositional 
identity urged by Frege. 
It may be thought, still, that act-type theorists may be in a better position than other 
semanticists to accept this ensuing ambiguity, since they can make certain additional 
assumptions about act types in view of which the resulting ambiguity seems more 
palatable. There are three such “additional assumptions” I want to consider: 
 
(1) The act types related to different analyses of a sentence are just ways of 
performing the act type which is the proposition the sentence expresses. 
 
(2) These act types necessarily coincide: one cannot perform one of them 
without performing the others.  
 
(3) These act types have the same truth conditions. 
 
But (1) is incompatible with the original act-type theories of Soames and Hanks. They 
take the act type of predicating a property of an object to be a proposition, not an act 
type by which the proposition can be performed. I will discuss this account as a 
possible “retreat position” in §5, but I want to note here already that it is difficult to 
see why the claim would mitigate the ambiguity, even if it were available to act-type 
theorists.  
Analogous points apply to (2) and (3): why should the fact that the three act types 
necessarily coincide, or have the same truth conditions, make it acceptable to say that 
the sentence is ambiguous? 
There are also specific worries about (2) and (3). We have already seen that (2) 
violates Frege’s identity conditions on propositions. It also seems that in order to 
perform the relevant act on a predicative propositional constituent, for instance, to 
predicate a property of something, one must “think about” that constituent in a way 
that requires a non-zero cognitive effort. If so, then entertaining or judging the 
proposition that 6 + 2 = 4 + 3 + 1 requires, implausibly, performing 31 distinct effort-
taking mental acts. 
Claim (3) is also uncongenial to act-type theorists, since they take propositions to 
be structured, and since the main motivation for doing so is that one can thereby 
distinguish propositions that have the same truth conditions. Thus, saying that the 
ambiguity is acceptable because the act types have the same truth conditions is in 
tension with a major motivation for structured propositions. 
 
IV. A FURTHER ARGUMENT AGAINST PLURALISTIC ACT-TYPE THEORIES 
 
Even if the above argument against standard act-type theories was conclusive, the 
argument against the “pluralist” variant was not. In this section, I will present a 
stronger argument against pluralism, which is independent of (A2) and of any notion 
of act types “involving” certain entities or of “overlapping”. The argument shows that 
pluralists are forced to posit infinitely many basic act types. 
Consider the sentence ‘7 + 8 = 15’, from which one can extract the three monadic 
predicates, 
 
 ‘7 + 8 = ξ’, 
 ‘7 + ξ = 15’, 
 ‘ξ + 8 = 15’. 
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If we try to avoid the conclusion that ‘7 + 8 = 15’ is ambiguous by multiplying basic 
act types, we need to posit not two, but three distinct basic act types. More 
specifically, we would need to posit distinct act types, A-ing, A*-ing, and A**-ing, 
such that,  
 
 (C2+)  (a) ‘7 + 8 = 15’ expresses A-ing [7 + 8 = ξ], [15] 
    (b) ‘7 + 8 = 15’ expresses A*-ing [7 + ξ = 15], [8] 
    (c) ‘7 + 8 = 15’ expresses A**-ing [ξ + 8 = 15], [7], 
 
For suppose that they are not all distinct. Then, some identity between two of them 
holds and then the argument from (A1) sets in, and we can infer that ‘7 + 8 = 15’ is 
ambiguous. We can generate infinitely many more arguments like this, with 
predicates of ever-increasing complexity. 
Given this infinity of basic act types, certain claims that the act-type theorist will 
want to make cannot be finitely stated. Consider, for instance, the definition of plug1. 
It seems that this definition will need one clause for each of the infinitely many forms 
that monadic predicates may take, where these “forms” are,  
 
R(a1, …, an, ξ),  
R(a1, …, an−1, ξ, an),  
R(a1, …, an−2, ξ, an−1, an),  
 
and so on, for each n. The simplest definition will define plug1 over predicative 
propositional constituents, which differ in which argument place (first, second, …) is 
“empty”. I will here consider a definition, which has one clause for each adicity: 
 
 (DP)  plug1(x, y) =df the entity z such that: 
 
(i) if x is monadic, then: 
      if x is simple, then z = the act type of B-ing x, y, and  
      if x is complex and its first place is empty, then z = A-ing x, y, and 
if x is complex and its second place is empty, then z = A*-ing x, y, 
and  
      … 
 
    (ii) if x is dyadic, then: 
      … 
 
The reason why this definition cannot be finitely completed is that the adicities of 
predicates have no upper limit, whence the dots in clause (i) cannot be finitely filled 
in. 
Note that I am here using, ‘empty’ and ‘place’ in non-standard senses, in which, 
for instance, the second place in ‘1 = ξ’ is empty, but not the first. Normally, one 
would say that any monadic predicate has only one place and that a place is by 
definition empty. But I think this alternative terminology should be obvious enough.  
 It may be suggested that a finite formulation might still be available if, instead of 
merely labelling these act types ‘A’, ‘A*’, ‘A**’, …, we refer to them using complex 
expressions containing numerals. For instance, we could posit a single, basic act type, 
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C-ing, which takes as objects not merely the semantic correlates of predicates and 
names, but also positive integers. Clause (i) can then be finitely restated as follows: 
 
(i′) if x is monadic, then: 
    if x is simple, then z = the act type of B-ing x, y, and  
    if x is complex and its nth place is empty, then z = C-ing x, y, n 
 
This is a finite formulation, which only commits one to an unproblematic infinity of 
numbers. However, this proposal is a non-starter. We are here supposed to avoid the 
ambiguity of ‘Mary loves John’ by appeal to the identity, 
 
[Mary loves John] = C-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John], 2 =  
= C-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary], 1. 
 
But this claim contradicts (A1), given trivial distinctness facts about the objects acted 
upon. I conclude that pluralist act type theorists can avoid the ambiguity problem only 
by positing an unacceptable infinity of basic act types.  
 
V. THREE RETREAT POSITIONS 
 
By a “retreat position”, I mean a theory that is modified so as to avoid the argument 
above, but that is still in the spirit of standard act-type theories. I will not define 
‘being in the spirit of’, but one important way of assessing this is by seeing whether 
the position in question will have the alleged advantages of standard act-type theories 
listed in the introduction. I will consider three retreat positions, which say, 
respectively, that propositions are  
 
(i)  equivalence classes of act types, 
(ii) results of act types, 
(iii) more inclusive act types (which can be performed by performing the usual 
act types of predicating or saturating).  
 
Option (i) is to define some relation of equivalence that makes the three acts related to 
‘Mary loves John’ equivalent, and then identify [Mary loves John] with their set, and 
similarly for other atomic sentences. The main problem with this idea is that it does 
not take propositions to be (syntactically) structured and so is not in the spirit of 
standard act-type theories. More precisely, this account is committed to taking 
equivalent propositions to be identical, which is precisely the kind of commitment one 
tries to avoid by taking propositions to be structured. 
One might try to avoid the worst excesses of unstructured views of propositions by 
setting stricter conditions on equivalence. If equivalence is cashed out simply in terms 
of truth-in-the-same-worlds or mutual inferability, then, for any p, q, [p] = [p & (q or 
not-q)], which is precisely the kind of consequence we are trying to avoid.  
But suppose we add the requirement that act types are equivalent only if the basic 
act type with “widest scope” in each is the same. Then, A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary] 
and A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] come out as equivalent, since the relevant basic act 
type in each of them is A-ing. Further, in order to distinguish this equivalence class 
from [Mary loves John and (p or not-p)], we could identify the latter with the act type 
of A+-ing [and], [Mary loves John], [p or not-p], where A-ing ≠ A+-ing. 
ACTS AND ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES	
16 	
But we can still not distinguish between [p and q] and [(p and q) and (r or not-r)]. 
Requiring in addition equivalent act types to have the same simple constituents would 
not be sufficient either, since [(Fa or not-Fa) and (Gb or not-Gb)] and [(Ga or not-
Ga) and (Fb or not-Fb)] would still come out as identical. The obvious remedy is to 
say that act types a and b are equivalent just in case they have identical structures and, 
for every entity e and node n in this structure, a has e at n just in case b has e at n. But 
now, A-ing [ξ loves John], [Mary] and A-ing [Mary loves ξ], [John] are no longer 
equivalent. This points to a general difficulty: that of distinguishing logically 
equivalent propositions without thereby multiplying propositions wherever there are 
alternative analyses. It is not clear whether any version of option (i) can meet this 
constraint, nor whether the resulting theory would be in the spirit of standard act-type 
theories. 
 Option (ii), on which propositions are results of act types, could perhaps be 
independently motivated.17 But the idea as it stands is highly underspecified: we do 
not yet know what kind of entity propositions are, whether abstract, concrete, events, 
states, sets, and so on. All we know is that they result from certain acts. 
There is also reason to think this account, however specified, will not be in the 
spirit of original act-type theories, because it will not assign any real theoretical work 
to act types. Assume that we decide that propositions are Xs, which result in some 
systematic way from act types of predicating or saturating. Suppose also we define 
plugi in the usual act-type-theoretical (Fregean or Russellian) way and then say that 
propositions are the values of some function plugi, such that plugi(x, y) always results 
in plugi(x, y). The crux is that we can now just refer to propositions using ‘plugi’, and 
any detour via act types will be otiose. The obvious alternative to (PA), for instance, 
would be, 
 
 (PA′)  PLUGi(‘F(ξ1, …, ξn)’, ‘a’) expresses plugi([F(ξ1, …, ξn)], [a]). 
 
Let’s finally consider option (iii), of taking propositions to be “more inclusive” act 
types, which can be performed by performing the usual act types of predicating or 
saturating. Here, [Mary loves John] would be an act type that can be performed by 
performing any of the three act types associated with ‘Mary loves John’. This seems 
to be in the spirit of the original act-type theory, since propositions are here identified 
with act types.  
So far, however, this proposal is seriously underspecified. What are these more 
inclusive act types, and how do we refer to them? In particular, can we refer to them 
using designators that contain designators of the propositional constituents? A closely 
related worry: toward which object(s) is [Mary loves John] directed, on this view? Is 
[Mary loves ξ] and [ξ loves John] among then, and what about [John] and [Mary]? 
These worries bear directly on the question of what the semantic axioms for atomic 
sentences are supposed to read. Consider, 
 
(P1′) For any predicate ‘F(ξ)’ and name ‘a’, PLUG1(‘F(ξ)’, ‘a’) expresses the 
act type of A-ing [F(ξ)], [a]. 
 
This is not available on option (iii), since the act type of A-ing [F(ξ)], [a] is now not 
the proposition expressed by ‘F(a)’ but merely an act type that can be performed by 																																																								
17  See Moltmann, “Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between 
actions and products”, op. cit. 
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performing that act type. One might, as an alternative, propose something along the 
lines of, 
 
(P1′′) For any predicate ‘F(ξ)’ and name ‘a’, PLUG1(‘F(ξ)’, ‘a’) expresses an 
act type that can be performed by performing plug1([F(ξ)], [a]). 
 
But (P1′′) does not by itself associate sentences with determinate semantic correlates. 
It does not say which act type is expressed by a given sentence. 
We could try describing the proposition expressed as the act type that can be 
performed by performing act type A. But how do we know that this description 
singles out a unique act type? This proposal also does not explain toward which 
objects [Mary loves John] is supposed to be directed. Similar remarks apply to the 
proposal that we refer to the act type as “the act type that can be performed by 
performing any of …”, where the dots are filled in with a complete list of the act types 
that are related to the analyses of the sentence (as we have been conceiving of them 
throughout). Again, uniqueness is not clearly guaranteed, and we still do not know 
toward which objects the inclusive act type is directed.  
By referring to the proposition as the act type of entertaining (or judging) that 
proposition, uniqueness is guaranteed (let us grant), but the other worries remain. 
‘The act type of entertaining [Mary loves John]’ does not contain designators of the 
relevant propositional constituents and we do not know which objects are acted upon. 
Consequently, it is also unclear how to formulate the semantic axioms.  
Let me consider one final possibility, which, while clearly related, goes somewhat 
beyond the original characterization of option (iii): propositions are act types directed 
toward simple constituents, which can be performed by performing act types directed 
toward complex constituents. Thus, [Mary loves John] is the act type of predicating 
loving of Mary and John (in that order), which can be performed by performing either 
of the two remaining act types. 
This account handles the problem of uniqueness and tells us toward which objects 
the act type is directed, namely, [Mary] and [John] only. But this last commitment 
immediately makes the account unable to compositionally handle sentences involving 
complex predicates. Since the act type expressed ex hypothesi is not directed toward 
any complex predicative propositional constituents, there is no semantic correlate to 
associate with complex predicates, which can help determine the semantic correlates 
of atomic sentences. 
A further, rather different complaint about this proposal is that one cannot simply 
stipulate that the act type of predicating loving of Mary and John can be performed by 
predicating loving John of Mary. This is something that must be derived from 
independently plausible assumptions, but it is not clear what those assumptions might 
be. Thus, like the two options previously considered, option (iii) raises several 
difficult questions, and is not, as it stands, a safe retreat position for act-type theorists. 
 
VI. A GENERAL CONSTRAINT ON STRUCTURED PROPOSITIONS 
 
Does the argument above generalize to all kinds of structured propositions, thus 
refuting the very idea? No, but it does amount to a general constraint on structured 
propositions. Very roughly, propositions may not be identified with the kind of 
construction that obeys a principle analogous to (A1). Since not all constructions do, 
however, the argument does not generalize. This, in any case, will be the upshot of 
this section. We will close by looking at Jeffrey King’s and Edward Zalta’s theories 
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of structured propositions, and see that while Zalta’s theory is not committed to the 
kind of ambiguity we have been discussing, King’s theory is.18 
Constructions that do not obey any principle analogous to (A1) include the 
following:  
 
(1) the mereological sum of x1, …, xn, 
 
(2) the state of affairs in which F(x1, …, xn), 
 
(3) x1^x2 (from Section 2) 
 
(Note that some constructions have a determinate number of variables, as in case (3).) 
Now, for a construction to “obey a principle analogous to (A1)” is for it to satisfy the 
general schema,  
 
(G) If X(x1, …, xn) = X(y1, …, yn), then each of x1, …, xn is identical with one of 
y1, …, yn. 
 
When I use a schematic letter in the “construction”, as in (2) above, I mean that it 
satisfies (G) if all of its instances do. 
That none of the constructions (1)–(3) satisfy (G) is shown by the following 
counterexamples: 
 
(C1) sum(sum(a, b), c) = sum(a, sum(b, c)),  
although sum(a, b) ≠ c ≠ a ≠ sum(b, c), 
 
(C2) the state of affairs in which John has the property of being loved by Mary = 
the state of affairs in which Mary has the property of loving John, although 
John ≠ being loved by Mary ≠ Mary ≠ loving John, 
 
(C3)  G^(Y^B) = (G^Y)^B, although G ≠ Y^B ≠ G^Y ≠ B.19  
 
Now, the general constraint on structured propositions that can be derived from the 
argument from alternative analyses reads, 
 
(GC)  [F(a)] = X([F(ξ)], [a]) only if X does not satisfy (G). 
 
For suppose X satisfies (G). We know that there will be cases in which [R(ξ, b)] ≠ [a] 
≠ [R(a, ξ)] ≠ [b]. From these assumptions, it follows that X([R(a, ξ)], [b]) ≠ 
X([R(ξ, b)], [a]), and, hence, that ‘R(a, b)’ is ambiguous.  
																																																								
18 The relevant works are King, The Nature and Structure of Content, op. cit., and 
Zalta, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, op. cit. 
19 How about ‘the property of R-ing x1, …, xn’? On a coarse-grained conception of 
properties, this construction fails to satisfy (G). For on such a conception, the property 
of being a world in which John has the property of being loved by Mary = the 
property of being a world in which Mary has the property of loving John. How things 
stand with fine-grained properties is less clear. In general, it seems difficult to give a 
general account of which kinds of constructions obey (G) principles and which do not. 
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While failing to satisfy (G) is a necessary condition for a construction type being 
identifiable with propositions, it is clearly not sufficient. For ‘the mereological sum of 
x1, …, xn’ fails to satisfy (G), but it does satisfy the principle, ‘X(x1, x2, x3) = 
X(x1, x3, x2)’. Thus, identifying a proposition with the sum of its constituents would 
entail, absurdly, that [R(a, b)] = [R(b, a)]. 
Let us now, finally, have a look at two extant theories of structured propositions, 
the theories of Jeffrey King and Edward Zalta, to see how they fare with alternative 
analyses.  
King identifies propositions with a certain kind of complex fact. The proposition 
that Rebecca swims is identified with the fact that Rebecca stands in the complex 
relation REL with the property of swimming. For now-familiar reasons, King must 
say that [Mary loves John] is identical both with  
 
(F1) the fact that Mary RELs [ξ loves John], and  
 
(F2) the fact that John RELs [Mary loves ξ].20 
 
The relevant instance of (G) is thus, 
 
(GK) If the fact that REL(x, y) = the fact that REL(z, w), then each of x and y is 
identical with one of z and w. 
 
We will see that King’s theory, like act-type theories, entails that sentences with 
alternative analyses are ambiguous. However, the argument for this conclusion takes a 
rather different route. For given the complexity and technical character of REL, we do 
not have reliable intuitions about (GK) as we do with (A1). Although we will soon 
find reason to reject (GK), this reason is an independent reason to believe that F1 ≠ F2 
(from which the falsity of (GK) can be inferred). Since the claim that F1 ≠ F2 is what 
we ultimately aim to derive, (GK) will play no role in our argument.  
Now, to see whether F1 = F2, we must look closer at REL. King defines REL as 
holding between x and y iff there is a language L, lexical items a and b of L and a 
context c, such that  
 
(i) a and b occur at the left and right terminal nodes (respectively) of the 
sentential relation R that in L encodes ascription, and 
(ii)  x is the semantic value of a in c, and 
(iii) y is the semantic value of b in c.21 
 
In contrast to the Lewisian, abstract conception of languages, King takes a language 
to be actually used.22 But in that case, there will be worlds in which F1 exists but F2 
does not. For instance, there is a world where there is a language containing a 
primitive lexical element whose semantic value is [Mary loves ξ] but no language 
with a lexical element whose semantic value is [ξ loves John]. I am assuming here 
that there can be non-composite lexical elements that designate complex properties, 
																																																								
20 King himself accepts these commitments: see his The Nature and Structure of 
Content, op. cit., pp. 16ff. 
21 King, The Nature and Structure of Content, op. cit., p. 62 
22 King, The Nature and Structure of Content, op. cit., pp. 46ff. 
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but this seems innocuous. If such a world exists, however, then F1 ≠ F2, even on a 
coarse-grained conception of facts, on which strict equivalence suffices for identity. 
 Suppose King switches to the Lewisian conception of languages in order to avoid 
ambiguity. Then, however, the definiens of REL becomes a necessary truth for any 
values of ‘x’ and ‘y’. Given the coarse-grained conception of facts, there is then only 
one atomic proposition! So the switch had better be coupled with a fine-grained, 
structured conception of facts. On such a conception, F1 = F2 only if (1) they have the 
same structure and (2) for any entity e and node n in this structure, F1 has e at n just 
in case F2 has e at n. But on such a conception, obviously, F1 ≠ F2, since the two 
facts have different entities at their nodes. (This argument equally afflicts King’s 
actual account, coupled with a fine-grained conception of facts). I conclude that 
King’s theory, like the act-type theory, entails that sentences with alternative analyses 
are ambiguous.  
 Zalta’s theory, by contrast, seems immune to the argument from alternative 
analyses. He refers to propositions using such gerunds as ‘Socrates having wisdom’, 
or ‘Mary standing in the loving relation to John’. But, intuitively, Mary’s having the 
property of loving John = John’s having the property of being loved by Mary. Thus, at 
least as far as these proposition designators are concerned, Zalta’s theory avoids the 
argument. True, these designators cannot be used to state semantic axioms for atomic 
sentences. For this purpose, Zalta uses a kind of technical proposition designator, but 
since we have no intuitions about them, there is no simple argument from an intuitive 
(G)-principle against Zalta’s theory. The same holds for Bealer’s theory. 23  This 
invites the anti-reductionist conclusion that in order to avoid the argument from 
alternative analyses, we must not identify propositions with some other kind of entity, 
like act types or facts of some kind. For now, however, this idea must remain a 
speculation. 
																																																								
23 George Bealer, Quality and Concept (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982). 
